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ABSTRACT 
 
The historical evolution of free trade has been accompanied by a plethora of debates, 
concerning both its positive effects and social costs. During the last decade, the subject of 
these disputes has markedly changed. The main objective of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) concluded 1947, was initially the reduction of tariffs introduced by 
states to protect their national economy. In this respect, the agreement has been markedly 
successful. Since the early 1970s, however, non-tariff barriers to free trade have moved to the 
centre of attention. This change of focus was fostered by more intensified domestic regulation 
especially in the fields of health and safety, consumer and environmental protection. These 
concerns are of such domestic significance that they cannot simply be abandoned for the sake 
of free trade; however, it also is common opinion that regulations in these areas cannot be 
accepted, if they merely mask protectionist interests. In 1994, the international trade system 
adapted to this situation by transforming the GATT into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). The most important reforms included an overhaul of its procedures of dispute 
settlement and the conclusion of special agreements concerning non-tariff barriers to free 
trade such as the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). These agreements aim at the 
balancing of their main economic objective, free trade, with domestic regulatory concerns of 
WTO members. This bundle of regulations has certainly furthered the emergence of 
transnational ‘governance arrangements’. Such new forms of ‘transnational governance’ have 
lent renewed importance to ‘old’ legal issues: How can new forms of transnational 
governance be qualified legally? What can be said about their (social) acceptance and 
(normative) legitimacy? Can this form of governance be ‘constitutionalized’ in such a way 
that law can defend or even regain its function as guarantor of and yardstick for legitimate 
governing? 
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Governance with Eroding State Government*  
 
C H R I S T I A N  J O E R G E S  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
When the European Commission, led by Jacques Delors, launched its well-known 
programme on the ‘Completion of the Internal Market’ in the mid 1980s,1 its proponents and 
critics expected both an intensified monitoring of regulations hampering competition and a 
‘regulatory competition’ fostered by the planned obligation to mutually recognize national 
legal norms. In such a competition, EC Member States would seek to defend or strengthen 
their economic competitiveness by loosening their regulatory policies and, hence, a ‘race to 
the bottom’ would begin. Regulation was considered a cost factor, whereas deregulation was 
seen as a way to gain efficacy. However, these expectations were proven wrong. What 
followed, was no simple and broad de-regulation, but an intensified re-regulation, which 
resulted in new forms of collaboration between state and non-state actors—later termed ‘new 
modes of governance’. The post-national constellation, which Europeanization has generated, 
has eroded the regulatory powers of nation states and their competence to assess the costs and 
benefits of opening national economies autonomously. Yet, Europeanization has also 
established sophisticated transnational governance arrangements, which could not have been 
achieved by nation states on their own. 
                                                          
*
  Translated from the German by Harry Bauer, London/Florence. -- This essay owes much to the participants 
in the Bremen project on ‘Social Regulation and World Trade’ and in particular the research assistance 
provided by Christiane Gerstetter and David Gerl. I am equally indebted to Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann with 
whom I organized in September 2004 a conference on ‘Legal Patterns of Transnational Social Regulation 
and International Trade’ at which I defended some of the ideas developed here further. Last but not least I 
would like to thank the participants of the risk regulation seminars held together with Marie-Curie-Fellow 
Rainer Nickel in the Academic Year 2004/2005 for many inspiring comments. 
 
1
  European Commission, Commission White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the Internal 
Market, COM (85) 310 final, 14 June 1985. 
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Apparently, Europe has managed both to establish free trade and, simultaneously, to develop 
refined forms of regulatory policies. Can the European experience offer some lessons for the 
organization of free trade at the international level and, especially, for easing the tension 
between the objective of free trade and national regulatory policies? Do we have to attribute 
the regulatory embedding of free trade in Europe to institutional particularities and specific 
European interest constellations? To what degree should these developments simply be 
understood as responses to domestic concerns about safety at work, the interest of consumers 
and the environment, cleverly exploited by lobby groups and political industrialists? Or, 
should we assume that a smooth functioning of international markets rests upon ‘social 
regulation’2—such as the reliable protection of consumers, the environment and safety at 
work—as a necessary precondition?3 Indeed, if international free trade can only be realized 
by dint of transnational governance arrangements, how can then the ‘appropriateness’ of 
transnational governance be assessed and ensured? Does the ‘market embedded nation state’ 
have to accept the loss of its regulatory autonomy because the functioning of international 
markets requires this? Would this central function for the establishment of markets alone 
render transnational forms of governance legitimate to such an extent that they would 
‘deserve recognition’, to take up a formula by Jürgen Habermas?4 
This essay attempts to explore this bundle of questions in three steps: A first step will be 
concerned with Europe and its particular experience. In particular, we will argue that the 
‘completion of the Internal Market’ required institutional innovations which established 
symbiotic relationships between markets and regulatory policies and which now represent a 
corner stone of European multi-level governance. 
The second part of the essay will explore the regulatory room for manoeuvre within the 
international trade system. Its institutional core, the World Trade Organization (WTO), does 
not command those regulatory powers and resources Europe’s Internal Market policies are 
able to draw on. Nevertheless, parallels are obvious: the WTO is confronted with similar non-
tariff barriers to trade and, hence, similar types of regulatory concerns, Europe has responded 
to in its re-regulatory policies from the mid 1980s onwards. We would like to aver that the 
shift from the old GATT to the new WTO regime needs to be understood as a dual process, in 
which the regulatory autonomy of nation states erodes while their regulatory concerns are 
maintained within new transnational governance arrangements. 
The third and concluding section touches upon the problem of the legitimation of 
transnational governance through law. It will further outline that there are striking parallels 
between the responses to regulatory concerns on different levels of governance—European as 
well as international. It is suggested that the emergence of novel forms of governance is a 
reaction to the impasse and gridlock of traditional regulatory modes, to which we cannot 
                                                          
2
  Here, I adopt Majone’s concept of ‘social’ regulation as policies in the areas of consumer and environmental 
protection and of health and safety at work, explicitly excluding distributive policies with the aim of 
implementing standards of social justice; G. Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’, 17 West 
European Politics (1994), pp. 77-101. 
3
  An elaboration of this argument can be found in C. Joerges and M. Everson, ‘The European Turn to 
Governance and Unanswered Questions of Legitimacy: Two Examples and Counter-intuitive Suggestions’, 
in C. Joerges, B. Stråth and P. Wagner (eds) The Economy as Polity: The Political Constitution of 
Contemporary Capitalism (London: UCL Press 2005, pp. 159-179. For more systematic studies see, e.g. see, 
pithy and in succession of Karl Polanyi, F. Block, Towards a New Understanding of Economic Modernity in 
C. Joerges, B. Stråth and P. Wagner (eds) op. cit., pp. 3-16. or theoretically more comprehensive, J. Beckert, 
Beyond the Market: The Social Foundations of Economic Efficiency (Princeton UP, Princeton, 2002). 
4
  J. Habermas, ‘Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights’ in J. Habermas, The Postnational 
Constellation: Political Essays (MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2001) pp. 113-129 at p. 113. 
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resort to again. And yet, we should be careful when assuming that what already exists equals 
the reasonable. Moreover, the emergence of forms of transnational governance poses a 
challenge to those notions of legitimacy we have become accustomed to under the roof of 
constitutional democracy. Hence, we argue that the particular form and degree of legitimate 
governing within constitutional democracies cannot be achieved in transnational 
constellations. This reveals the limitations for strategies of ‘juridification’ at the international 
level, applied by law and politics 
A note on terminology may be in order here. ‘Juridification’ is just one of those 
concepts—widely used, yet multifaceted, vague and hence contested—leaving indeterminate 
its conceptual foundation and normative aspiration. We, therefore, will briefly try to elaborate 
on our grasp of this and other key concepts either within the text itself or within its notes.5 
 
 
I Non-tariff barriers in the European Community: the freedom of free trade as 
movens for regulatory innovation 
The re-regulatory and modernizing strategies, developed to ‘complete’ the European Internal 
Market, have been documented in depth and breadth.6 What we, thus, will focus on are those 
patterns of governance, which have to a remarkable extent enabled Europe to match market 
integration with the market-correcting logic of social regulation. 
 
I.1 The Cassis jurisprudence under Article 28 EC Treaty: a conflict-of-laws approach 
The most important of Europe’s institutional innovations is hardly mentioned any more in the 
debate about ‘new modes of governance’. This innovation entailed substituting the 
                                                          
5
  ‘Juridification’ is a particularly complex notion. The term is a translation of the concept of ‘Verrechtlichung’, 
coined by leftist labour lawyers in the Weimar Republic in their criticism of law as a means to tame class 
conflicts [see G. Teubner, ‘Juridification—Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’, in G. Teubner (ed) 
Juridification of Social Spheres (de Gruyter, Berlin 1987) pp. 3-48 at p. 9] . Only decades later the term 
found its way into the law and society studies of the Anglo-Saxon academia. ; Currently, the use of the term 
changes, even on ‘the continent’: still the term carries a critical perception of law aware of its ambivalent 
effects. As such legal effects figured early the depoliticization of societal conflicts and later on, and most 
famously, the ‘colonialization of the life-world’ through welfare programs; see J. Habermas, ‘Law as 
Medium and Law as Institution’ in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (de Gruyter, 
Berlin 1985) pp. 203-220. In International Relations, however, the term ‘legalization’ has become popular, 
following K.W. Abbott, R.O. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A.-M. Slaughter and D. Snidal, ‘The Concept of 
Legalization’, 54 International Organization (2000), pp. 401-419. Pertinent studies explore parallels and 
differences between the subordination of political process to rule of law requirements within states, and the 
causes and consequences of rule-bound governance beyond the nation state. Such analyses of the reasons and 
consequences of rule-bound governance hardly resemble the critical and normative approach of the debates 
about juridification. Yet, there is no consensus among political scientists, legal sociologists and theorists 
about the proper use of both terms. – For a comprehensive and clarifying excellent discussion carfully 
distinguishing between Juridification is related to two other concepts, ‘judicialization' and ‘legalization' cf. Lars Chr. 
Blichner, Anders Molander, 'Mapping Juridification', Oslo 2005 (on file with author). 
6
  V. Eichener, Das Entscheidungssystem der Europäischen Union: Institutionelle Analyse und 
demokratietheoretische Bewertung (Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 2000). 
Christian Joerges 
 4 
‘traditional method’ of integration policies, integration by dint of legislative acts aiming at 
legal harmonization, with the principle of ‘mutual recognition’, ultimately intended to take 
some load off European jurisdiction. Back in 1979, the new principle became manifest in the 
well-known Cassis de Dijon ruling by the European Court of Justice (ECJ): The Case saw the 
Court declare that a German ban on the sale of a French liqueur—the alcohol content of 
which was lower than its German counterparts—was incompatible with the principle of free 
movement of goods (Article 30 EC Treaty, now 28 EC).7 The principle of free movement of 
goods stood not in the way of national regulations protecting consumers’ health and their 
right to information, yet, generally, regulations by different Member States had to be treated 
as equal and worth of mutual recognition. In the case of conflict, regulatory differences have 
to be balanced in accordance with the principle of free movement of goods. 
In the Cassis case, this was rather simple: confusion among German consumers could be 
avoided by the relatively mild measure of clearly indicating the low alcohol content of the 
French liqueur instead of a ban. ‘Easy cases can make tough law’: the ruling was ‘simply’ 
convincing, yet far from being trivial. With its legal argument, the Court, on its own 
initiative, granted itself the competence to review the legitimacy of national legislation—it 
appointed itself as constitutional court. This move was of principle theoretical importance and 
had far-reaching practical ramifications.8 
In our comparison of European and international legal responses to non-tariff barriers to 
trade, it is important to stress that the ECJ’s renowned line of reasoning can easily be 
translated into the vocabulary of a much older discipline, i.e., that of conflict of laws. Indeed, 
the ruling was about a conflict of laws to the extent that German law did not tolerate the 
French product, whereas France did perceive its liquor as tradable. In its response to the legal 
conflict among German importers and producers concerning the dissimilarities between 
German and French law, the ECJ identified a ‘meta-norm’ which both legal systems were 
able to accept: since both countries were committed to the objective of free trade, the ECJ 
was able to prevent Germany from implementing a regulation, which did not guarantee an 
indispensable (yet legitimate) protection of consumer interests. The general importance of 
this type of conflict resolution becomes apparent, once we take into account that market-
constituting and market-correcting regulatory policies are the rule when it comes to more 
complex and hazardous products than liquor. To the contrary, markets rely on regulatory 
measures securing ‘trust’ into products on the side of both traders and consumers.9 
 
I.2 A new approach to technical harmonization and standardization: ‘private 
transnationalism’ 
In the presentation of its White Paper on ‘the Completion of the Internal Market’, the 
European Commission stressed that the basis of its new integration strategy was to be found 
in the ECJ’s jurisprudence in general and its Cassis ruling in particular. The White Paper’s 
proposals were, however, far more radical. This holds especially true for the ‘New Approach 
to technical harmonization and standardization’. 10  What it entailed was more than the 
                                                          
7
  Case 120/78, Commission v. Germany, [1979] ECR 649—Cassis de Dijon. 
8
  See M.P. Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution 
(Hart, Oxford, 1997), p. 150 et seq. 
9
  For the argumentative context of this claim, see note 3. 
10
  European Commission, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization, COM (85) 19 
final, 31 January 1985. 
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mediation between conflicting regulatory notions of Member States. With the new approach, 
a transnational mode of governance was established replacing the public regulation of product 
safety with a ‘private transnationalism’.11 
The history of the new approach has often been reconstructed, most recently and superbly 
by Harm Schepel.12 To summarize: the endeavour to establish a common market confronted 
the EC with a plethora of dilemmas: under the umbrella of the paradigm of ‘integration by 
law’, the common market should be achieved by harmonizing the relevant national norms. 
This task required positive legislation to a Sisyphean extent. The situation was hardly affected 
by the replacement of the old unanimity rule of Article 100 EC Treaty with qualified-majority 
voting in 1987 (Article 100a EC Treaty). Similarly, the implementation of the new obligation 
to mutually recognize legislation, arguably imposed by the Cassis de Dijon decision of 1979, 
caused complex issues but did not lead to wide-ranging changes. On the other side, even 
private norm systems, widely used in Germany to guarantee product safety, were not more 
pro-integration. These voluntary, sub-legal product standards were by definition merely 
‘private’ obstacles to trade, which could not be overcome by legislative measures meant to 
press for the harmonization of public law. The point of the ‘new approach’ was covered by a 
bundle of well-tuned measures: European legislation was markedly relieved by its exclusive 
concentration on ‘essential safety requirements’; whereas the task of detailing these general 
requirements was delegated to experts of European and national standardization bodies. The 
involvement of non-state actors implicated a de facto ‘delegation’ of law-making powers, 
which could, however, publicly not be admitted. Harm Schepel13 cites, with a degree of ironic 
distance, a renowned member of the standard-setting community: 
The new approach ‘makes it possible better to distinguish between those aspects of Community 
harmonization activities which fall within the province of the law, and those which fall within the 
province of technology, and to differentiate between matters which fall within the competence of 
public authorities and those which are the responsibility of manufacturers and importers’.14 
Unsurprisingly, this wording veils the political dimensions of product standardization. In 
order to overcome the dilemmas of the ‘traditional’ community method, the protagonists of 
the new approach had to aver that legislation should be content with setting ‘essential safety 
requirements’ without delegating norm-setting functions to non-state actors. The 
collaboration between state and non-state actors in the field of standardization, however, has a 
long tradition, which lays the foundation for the general trust in its capacity. At the same 
time, national and European public authorities maintained the possibility to intervene in cases 
of mishandling. 
 
I.3  The Administration of the Internal Market: European committees and European agencies  
Two more European institutional innovations need to be mentioned, the European 
committee system and European agencies. Both operate at the crossroads of market-
constitution and social regulation. Similarly to the new approach, these institutions 
complement community law, here understood according to the conflict of laws approach, in a 
particular way: they achieve what Niklas Luhmann has termed the ‘cognitive opening’ of 
                                                          
11
  H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating 
Markets (Hart, Oxford, 2005), p. 37. 
12
  Ibid., pp. 37-76. 
13
  Ibid., p. 17. 
14
  F. Nicolas, Common Standards for Enterprises (Office of Official Publications, Luxembourg, 1995), p. 94. 
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law,15 enabling to draw on sources of knowledge beyond law caused by issues of Internal 
Market constitution and management.  
The European committee system is particularly important, interesting—and contested. 
Through this system, the Commission organizes, in collaboration with experts appointed by 
national administrations, the implementation of Community law in issue areas such as food 
safety, health and safety at work and consumer protection. The Committee system was 
established both to compensate for the lack of genuine Community administrative powers and 
to allow the Member States control of the Commission. Moreover, it also fosters the 
acceptance of European decisions by involving national bodies. The committees’ core 
function is to ‘shred’ the functional and structural tensions of the Internal Market project into 
workable pieces. This ‘comitology’ system is concerned with ‘technical’ and ‘political’ 
considerations, functional needs and normative issues. The committees’ fluid composition 
reflects upon their main task, i.e., to balance the available stock of technical knowledge with 
regulatory concerns and to match both. They, however, also mirror the multitude of interests 
and political discrepancies inherent in the process of implementation itself. The committees 
often act as ‘mini-councils’ balancing market-integration and Member State interests, which 
carries strong indications that their considerations take place in an issue-oriented, deliberative 
manner.16 Reflecting their hybrid nature, these activities can be characterized as ‘political 
administration’,17 i.e., administration bound by legal principles, yet cognitively open and 
paying attention to public acceptance.18 
Independent agencies featured as core institutions in Giandomenico Majone’s conception 
of the EU as a ‘regulatory state’.19 Majone’s suggestions found much attention, yet they were 
never implemented completely. Europe has, however, adopted his term and established an 
impressive number of bodies under that name. Their current and future nature, however, 
remains indeterminate. What continues to be uncontested is that the new European Agencies 
just partly share features with their American counterpart, the Independent Regulatory 
Agencies. They are no self-sufficient bureaucracies and hold no law-making powers. These 
agencies are charged to administer licensing procedures, such as in the case of pharmaceutical 
products, to informally support and accompany policy-making by gathering and providing 
policy-relevant information. The new European entities meet a demand for market-corrective 
and sector-specific regulation, yet, according to the Commission’s conception only indirectly 
or by doing the latter’s groundwork.20 
Official statements hold that their purpose is merely ‘technocratic’. This notion mirrors 
their semi-autonomous status, indeed, and is well compatible with their function of 
                                                          
15
  N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., 1995), pp. 77 et seq. 
16
  T. Roethe, EG-Ausschusswesen und Risikoregulierung: Ein Problem von Handlungsstruktur und 
Rationalität (San Domenico di Fiesole: EUI Working Paper Law 94/7, 1994); C. Joerges and J. Neyer, 
‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of 
Comitology’, 3 European Law Journal (1997) pp. 273-299.  
17
  C. Joerges, ‘Comitology and the European Model? Towards a Recht-Fertigungs-Recht in the 
Europeanisation Process’, in E. O. Eriksen, C. Joerges and J. Neyer (eds) European Governance, 
Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation (Arena Report 2/2003, Oslo, 2003) pp. 501-540. 
18
  M. Everson, ‘Administering Europe?’, 36 Journal of Common Market Studies (1998), pp. 195-216. 
19
  G. Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’, 17 West European Politics (1994) pp. 77-101.. 
20
  See C. Joerges, The Commission’s White Paper on Governance in the EU: A Symptom of Crisis?’. Guest 
Editorial, 39 Common Market Law Review (2002) pp. 441-445. ‘”Deliberative Supranationalism”- Two 
Defences’, 8 European Law Journal (2002), pp. 133-151.; E. Chiti, ‘On European Agencies’, in E.O. 
Eriksen, C. Joerges and J. Neyer (eds) European Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for 
Democratisation (EUI-RSCA/Arena: Fiesole, Oslo, 2003), pp. 271-322. 
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supporting the ‘stakeholders’ of the Internal Market in the articulation of their interests. It is 
equally compatible with the claim that ‘administering’ the Internal Market has more to do 
with the ‘neutral’ support of industrial activities than with the conception and implementation 
of politico-social values and objectives. The legal view, however, that the new agencies are 
merely the Commission’s auxiliary bodies is deficient, if not misleading. Although they 
formally are subordinate and despite the membership of national representatives within their 
management structures, the agencies seem to be relatively well shielded against direct, 
explicitly political interventions due to their founding statutes (Council directives and 
regulations), their organizational stability, their relative (and varying) budgetary autonomy 
and their close collaboration with national bureaucracies. However, all these embeddings 
implicate that the agencies cannot autonomously develop their agenda. 
None of the above outlined forms of transnational governance—the new approach to 
technical harmonization and standardization, the comitology system and the new agencies—
resembles the Weberian type of state bureaucracy. None of the involved actors serves as 
transmission belt or merely as a cog in the works of hierarchical administrative machinery, 
executing the legally constituted will of the political sovereign. Rather, their mode of action is 
communication. Communication alone allows them to build and maintain networks of 
independent, yet relatively autonomous decision-makers in European multi-level governance; 
by dint of communication they are able to induce those netted actors to a more deliberative 
style of problem-solving.21 
 
 
II Non-tariff barriers to trade and the WTO: a survey of conflict-resolving and 
policy-integrating mechanisms 
European law and WTO law embody different legal realms. Comparisons, drawing upon the 
experience of both institutions, are often considered as all too precarious due to the obvious 
and significant institutional discrepancies. And yet, some functional parallels are so striking 
that a contrasting comparison might help to answer our main questions:22 both institutions 
deal with the tension-ridden relationship between free trade objectives and regulatory 
concerns, with the ‘shared, but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international 
trade and of protecting […] life and health’—to quote the WTO-Appellate Body in the 
Hormones case.23 The non-tariff barriers to trade, to which the proponents of international 
free trade have to pay more and more attention in the last decades, are frequently identical 
with those requirements the EU tends to recognize as legitimate restrictions to the freedom of 
intra-Community trade. At the international level as well, the SPS and the TBT Agreements 
are institutionalized responses to the issue, under which preconditions social-regulatory 
concerns need to be respected and might even evolve into ‘positive’ requirements to 
international trade. Various, winded paths might lead to such a development. 
                                                          
21
  C. Joerges, ‘Comitology and the European Model?’; J. Neyer, ‘Discourse and Order in the EU: A 
Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Governance’, 41 Journal of Common Market Studies (2003) pp. 687-
706. 
22
  J. Peel, Risk Regulation Under the WTO/SPS Agreement: Science as an International Normative Yardstick 
(Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 2/04, New York University School of Law, New York, 2004). 
23
  Appellate Body Report EC—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R 
and WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, para. 177. 
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Our exploration of the parallels between the EU and WTO in this section will merely deal 
with the ‘juridification’ and ‘judicialization’ of conflict resolutions in the field of product 
regulation. Product regulation is obviously closer linked to the realization of free trade than 
‘process regulation’: product-related mandatory requirements directly prevent the import of 
goods, whereas process regulations do not necessarily directly affect the production quality; 
they are hard to justify and implement: just think of an importing state demanding certain 
labour and environmental standards from an exporting state. This, however, does not qualify 
a categorical or normative difference. We merely assume that legal transnational product 
regulation is more likely than ‘juridification’ in the fields of health and safety at work or 
environmental protection. 
More important than this pragmatic consideration is a qualitative one. Its line of reasoning 
may be briefly introduced with the help of two strands of argument: first, we claim that both 
community law and WTO law can be understood—and justified—as ‘conflict of laws’. 
Second, we claim that the emergence of transnational governance, which aims at conflict-
resolution by dint of expert knowledge, resembles the secular trend towards both the 
‘cognitive opening’24 of national legal systems and the coupling of ‘authority by office’ and 
of ‘authority by expertise’25. In a particular respect, these phenomena fit into our conflict of 
laws approach: even ‘scientifically’ grounded solutions are not necessarily backed by a higher 
authority, they have to gain legitimacy according to conflict of laws. The combination of 
normative expectations (resistant to change, according to Luhmann) and cognitive 
expectations (‘learning’) partly leads to a de-legalization of governance, escaping traditional 
legal methodology. In the following, these hitherto rather abstract claims will be illustrated. 
 
II.1 The limits of ‘judicialization’: procedural policy-coordination via conflict-of-laws 
methodologies 
As emphasized in the previous section, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on Article 28 EC should be 
understood as a new type of conflicts law, seeking to ‘harmonize’ the principle of freedom of 
intra-Community trade with the legitimate regulatory concerns of EC Member States. Our use 
of the conflict of laws needs to be defended against likely misunderstandings. It starkly 
differs from classical ‘Kollisionsrecht’ (private international law) in the tradition of Friedrich 
Carl von Savigny, which sought decisions by the criteria of ‘spatial’ justice applying that law 
with the closest resemblance to the given legal state of affairs. In contrast, conflicts law seeks 
to overcome legal differences by dint of meta-norms, which the jurisdictions involved can 
accept as supra-national yardsticks in the evaluation and correction of their own 
jurisprudence. 
The same holds for the reports of the WTO Appellate Body assessing whether health and 
safety related non-tariff barriers to trade are compatible with the SPS Agreement. To 
generalize this observation: the SPS Agreement does not refer to some supranational 
legislative authority. It provides a framework that allows WTO Members to seek the 
resolution of conflicts, arising out of the extra-territorial effects of their regulatory policies. In 
fundamental congruence with EU law, it seeks to identify a conflict-resolving meta-norm via 
a cognitive opening of legal decision-making—via references to ‘scientific’ knowledge and 
‘methods of risk assessment’. 
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It is not just of theoretical interest to highlight these parallels; it is also of politico-practical 
relevance as a conflict-of-laws approach treats the sovereignty and regulatory concerns of 
affected jurisdictions more prudently. Conflict of laws does not replace national law with 
transnational substantive law; instead it seeks to establish rules of compatibility. However, it 
is hard and not merely ‘soft law’: conflict of laws ‘constitutionalizes’ conflict-settlement 
procedures within the EU and at the international level. If it mingles normative standards with 
cognitive elements, it still does so in the name of law. This type of constitutionalization has 
not been considered by Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaïdis in their critique of a 
‘constitutional’ understanding of WTO law as going ‘a step too far’. 26  Indeed, the 
particularity of conflict of laws is that it does not need to invoke some supranational 
legislator, let alone some kind of regional, sectoral or functionaldemos—in stark contrast to 
orthodox suprantionalism and conventional constitutionalism. Moreover, conflict of laws is 
tolerant; it respects the legitimacy of different legal systems. It insists, however, that none of 
these norm systems holds universal validity. Hence, this resolves Nikolaus von Cues’ unitas 
in diversitas paradoxon that found its way into the European Draft Constitutional Treaty.27 
It might seem unconventional if not idiosyncratic to assign to conflict of laws a 
constitutional function and to conceptualize EU law and WTO law in that terminology. What 
these fields have in common, however, with post-classical conflict of laws is the task of 
mitigating between competing legitimate legal systems and their validity claims. The 
adoption of the conflict of laws termoin0olkgy is hence by no means simply arbitrary. It 
rather reflects long-term and irreversible developments: here the transformation of the GATT 
dating back to 1947 into the WTO 1994 is only one element of many. It must suffice here to 
outnie these complex developments briefly.28 
The disciplines of international private, economic and administrative law have all, albeit 
often reluctantly, become aware of the modern legal systems’ regulatory dimensions. These 
have to be taken into account, if law is given the task to ‘appropriately’ respond to 
international or transnational constellations. From the age of state sovereignty on, the main 
difficulty of conflict law has been that there is no ‘super-law’, which could take on the 
function of genuine law. Even if the classical international private law demands to apply alien 
(private!) law, it does this by dint of its own national legal powers. All subject matter under 
public law or relevant to sovereignty hardly overcome both the ‘classical’ fundamental 
arguments and the ‘unilateral’ or ‘one-sided’ definitions of how to apply national law 
internationally (the lex fori). The rejection of validity claims rooting in alien legal systems is 
mainly founded in the traditional notion of sovereignty but can also be based on good 
‘constitutional’ reasons, e.g., if the legitimacy of legal validity claims are doubted given they 
originate from an undemocratic processes. But even if we suspended the latter fundamentalist 
objection, courts apparently exceed their constitutionally legitimated mandate when they are 
expected to handle transnational matters and/or to mediate between autonomous state orders. 
Thus, the American conflict lawyer Brainerd Currie has claimed this issue fundamentally 
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irresolvable—even before the backdrop of ‘interlocal’ US-American conflict law: state courts 
are neither legally authorized nor substantially competent to decide on competing validity 
claims of different legal systems and on their ramifications for the communities involved.29 
This argument seems to be too rigid in an age of ‘late sovereignty’ and hardly acceptable 
for a union perceived by itself as a ‘legal community’. Although our appeals can hardly been 
seen as a sufficient solutions to those problems brought forward by Curie, it might still be 
possible to transfer them into legal arguments given that conflict law is understood and 
applied in a proceduralist manner. Exactly this is possible and imperative for the EU and even 
more, pace Curie, for federal states like the US. ‘Proceduralization’ in a conflict-of-laws 
approach implies that such a meta-norm is found which allows all jurisdictions involved both 
to cope with their genuine functions and to maintain their legitimate concerns, respected by 
community law. Hence, Currie’s caveats against the decision-making powers of courts are not 
convincing. Conflicts are caused by democratically legitimized polities and not by courts, 
which move within the typical realm of law when seeking a conflict norm. They gain their 
transnational legitimacy simply by responding to the systematic failure of national democracy 
and by referring to exactly those principles and rules established by constitutional states 
themselves.30 That courts are substantially overtaxed in their pursuit of appropriate conflict 
norms is a caveat hardly coherent as well. Courts cannot take on the work of those numerous 
experts involved in problem-solving within the Internal Market project. What they can do is 
to ‘constitutionalize’ new forms of governance.31 
Instead of further systematically elaborating on these considerations, in the following, I 
will illustrate their significance and limitations by two famous examples from the EU and the 
WTO context. To take up first the putatively ‘trivial’ Cassis case again and to rephrase its 
holding: France does not need to adapt the alcohol content of its liqueur to German legal 
requirements. At the same time, Germany can continue to protect its consumers from 
misinformation. The interests of both jurisdictions can be satisfied by a conflict norm 
demanding the suppliers of Cassis de Dijon in Germany to mandatory declare the alcohol 
content of their product. However, convincing solutions of such a kind are rarely as simple 
and unproblematic. They often require a ‘cognitive opening’ of the legal system and quite 
sophisticated responses to intricate regulatory issues. The ‘new modes of governance’ which 
the EU has established, especially its comitology system,  can be inbterpreted as 
systematically completing conflict of laws. This is not to suggest that these hybrid institutions 
are operating always successfully. However, In the context of the EU, they have proven to be 
productive and efficient, and their further constitutionalization seems at least conceivable. 
Beyond the EU, issues are more complex as the transatlantic conflict over hormones 
illustrates.32 In the most notorious of all transatlantic conflicts brought before the WTO, the 
subject matter was the administration of growth hormones to cattle—illegal in the EU, 
common practice in the US. Face to the free trade objective within WTO law, the Europeans 
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could not explicitly refer to the genuine interest of their agriculture. An obligation to 
information, according to the Cassis case, would have been possible, yet it remained 
problematic: the Americans feared that the well-known and commercially exploitable 
preferences of European consumers would lead to a de facto discrimination of their products. 
Furthermore, a reliable labelling system seemed to be difficult to establish. But first and 
foremost, would the administered hormones turn out to be unhealthy indeed; their mere 
labelling would not suffice. 
All this seems to suggest an appropriate conflict norm already entailed in the SPS 
Agreement: measures by WTO members cannot be ‘maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence’ (Article 2.2) and must be based on the risk assessment methods of the relevant 
international organizations (Article 5). Yet, a meta-norm, referring to scientific knowledge as 
peacemaker, is not that innocent—actors involved know this quite well. Three reasons might 
suffice to illustrate this point: first, science typically provides no clear answers to questions 
posed by politicians and lawyers; second, it cannot resolve ethical and normative 
controversies about numerous technologies; third, consumer Angst might be so significant 
that neither policy-makers nor the economy dare to ignore it, although scientific experts 
might assess a risk as tolerable or even marginal.33 
All these difficulties, however, do not stand in the way of applying conflict of laws and its 
problem structure to WTO law. This does not jeopardize the insight that—when dealing with 
regulatory differences—the pursuit of a meta-norm might be more successful than the search 
for substantive transnational rules, as the former intervenes less than the latter in WTO 
members’ competences. Even when the meta-norms remain too hard to find or indeterminate, 
they may nevertheless further the resolution of the conflict as, for instance, in the hormone 
conflict. The Appellate Body was able to structure the ongoing controversy by pointing to 
risk analyses and the interpretation of this measure in a report and, thus, led to a generally 
civilized conduct of the conflict. 
Hence, Currie’s argument holds that conflict of laws is, in cases of ‘true conflicts’, a 
political exercise at the margins of law.34 This does not, however, exclude that decision-
making is aware of these margins and, yet, still endeavours to promote international comitas 
or,35 at least, diplomacy in the ‘shadow of the law’.36 The borders between both are not as 
strict as legal formalists tend to portray them. Andreas F. Loewenfeld, a Grand Master well-
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versed in all international legal disciplines and rapporteur to the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States in 1987, does not shy away from interpreting the 
‘reasonableness’-formula, as drafted by himself and  included in the restatement for the 
application of alien law, its vagueness notwithstanding as hard law, 37  as a so-to speak 
‘juridified’ comitas. 38  He might, however, underestimate the difficulties involved in a 
problem-appropriate juridification. The latter has, first, to guarantee a cognitive opening of 
law—taking into account non-legal expert knowledge—which has been established by 
numerous institutional innovations in the EU; this might be very hard to replicate on the 
international level. The main difficulties are caused by the different conditions for governance 
on the national, European and international level. These discrepancies hinder the development 
of similar and equivalent forms of legally bound governance. 
We will later come back to this claim, for the moment we may just point to a central 
implication for our argument: it cannot be expected that the ‘judicialization’ of the WTO-
procedures,39 as implemented by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), guarantees legally perfect solutions, yet one has to assume that 
the Appellate Body will refer issues of dispute back to politics and diplomacy. This claim is 
certainly in need of some elaboration. We will, hence, proceed by introducing several 
examples in order to further clarify our concerns. 
 
II.2  Limits of juridification: the example of product-related transnational governance 
arrangements 
Internationally established product standards, ensuring a sufficient level of protection, are 
seen as the safest way to coordinate both the concern with free trade and with health and 
safety. The process of international standardization, involving—non-state—international 
organizations, has been enormously impressive, indeed; just think of, the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The ISO, alone, administers around 
14,000 standards. Some 30,000 experts, organized in Technical Committees, Sub-committees 
and Working Groups, work on their elaboration. 40  The—intergovernmental—Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), established by the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), is the relevant body in the foodstuffs sector.41 
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Fundamentally, both bodies follow a harmonization philosophy based on the TBT 
Agreement in the case of the ISO and on the SPS Agreement in the case of the CAC. Yet, on 
a near global scale, any stringent harmonization is neither economically reasonable nor 
politically possible. Moreover, the WTO holds no regulatory competences, which could be 
delegated to the ISO or the CAC. The difference to the EU is obvious. However, those 
sufficiently familiar with the jurisprudence of the ECJ on Article 28 EC might expect that 
forms of transnational governance emerge on a global level as well, despite such legal 
deficiencies. 
The TBT Agreement prescribes in its Article 2.2 that the technical regulations by its 
members ‘shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, 
taking into account the risks that non-fulfilment of these objectives would create’. The 
legitimate objectives include those concerns recognized by European law, in particular, the 
protection of health and safety at work and the environment. Unsurprisingly, there exists no 
equivalent to the European precept of mutual recognition, instead Article 2.7 demands that 
members ‘give positive consideration’ to alien regulations in order to prove whether ‘these 
regulations adequately fulfil the objectives’ of the importing member state. All this resembles 
the well-known preference for performance in contrast to construction standards in European 
law, yet Article 2.8 only reluctantly formulates: ‘Wherever appropriate, Members shall 
specify technical regulations based on product requirements in terms of performance rather 
than design or descriptive characteristics’.’. Despite this reluctance, the TBT Agreement has 
quite efficiently fostered the use of international product standards. This is mainly due to its 
Article 2.4 which provides:  
Where technical regulations are required and international standards exist or their completion is 
imminent, members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical 
regulations except when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means […]. 
The SPS Agreement has pursued a very similar strategy, which proved to be quite effective as 
well. Prior to the adoption of the SPS Agreement, the impact of CAC standards was 
ostensibly quite limited. They had no legally binding power whatsoever. The SPS Agreement 
has changed the situation quite dramatically by requiring in its Article 3.1 that WTO 
Members ‘base’ SPS measures on international standards, guidelines and recommendations. 
In legal terms, the SPS requirement is clearly much less stringent than a mandatory 
supranational norm. De jure, the ‘right’ of a single WTO member to autonomously determine 
the level of risk their population has to live with remains untouched. Therefore, the SPS 
Agreement had to apply a regulatory strategy close to the European New Approach to 
harmonization and standardization. Article 3.2 provides that national ‘measures which 
conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations’ have to be recognized as 
necessary protection measures. This is a preferential treatment apparently well received. 
Neither the TBT nor the SPS Agreement seeks to prescribe a substantive yardstick for the 
evaluation of product standards, which would necessarily lead to uniform results. This is why 
the Agreements’ means of aiding decision-making can be understood with the conflict-of-
laws approach. In the case of the SPS Agreement, ‘science’ is the point of reference, although 
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not as an objective standard prescribing the content of regulatory decisions. Moreover, the 
function of ‘science’ is to discipline and rationalize disputes about regulatory policies. 
Nevertheless, even this cautious interpretation of the potential function of commitments to 
‘science’ needs to be qualified further. The account of hormone administering, which is of 
exemplary importance here, did not end in any clear-cut agreement detailing the kind of 
scientific evidence the conflict parties could submit to. The famous formula in the Report of 
the Appellate Body speaks for itself: 
‘The risk that is to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a 
science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as 
they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real 
world where people live and work and die’.42 
The TBT Agreement and the ISO as well as the SPS Agreement and the CAC provide a 
framework for the elaboration of transnational product standards—a framework which 
enables political processes while it remains embedded in them. Thus, the limits of scientific 
objectivity mark the limits of the juridification of conflict settlement. 
 
II.3 Two interim observations 
Our analysis, hitherto, warrants two conclusions, logically leading to the two issues 
discussed in the following section. The first concerns the emergence of transnational ‘law’. 
We have argued that processes of juridification, responding to concerns of social regulation, 
most likely emerge in the field of product regulation. However, neither the norm-creation of 
the WTO-TBT-ISO nor of the WTO-SPS-CAC must be equated with law-making in 
constitutional democracies. The described mechanisms of coordination and norm-creation 
might be more adequately characterized as governance arrangements— ‘governance’ is, 
hence, the category we turn to first. 
The second observation concerns the relationship of law and politics, more precisely the 
embeddeding of legal regimes in transnational political processes. The kind and extend of 
their nexus is by no means one and the same. Where conflicts can be resolved by dint of 
conflict norms, the law is in so far a ‘strong’ one as it guides decisions, it, however, is in so 
far an ‘imperfect’ one as it does not prescribe any substantial norm with the claim to 
supranational validity. Where ever transnational governance operates with substantive norms, 
such as on the field of product or process regulation, it will provoke an intensified political 
supervision. For social and political scientists, our conclusion may sound vague and hardly 
exiting, lawyers, however, have to take it seriously: We claim that there is a strong nexus 
between the tension and interdependence of law and politics on one side and the 
problématique of legitimate transnational governance on the other. More precisely, it is the 
difficulty to rephrase at the international level the democratic notion of legitimacy as legal 
mediator under the rule of law. This is the second aspect the following section will turn to. 
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III. The ‘turn to governance’ and its legal-constitutional risks 
In Europe, governance has become an extremely popular concept ever since the 
Commission President, Romano Prodi, referred to it in a programmatic speech to the 
European Parliament on 15 February 2000 in Strasbourg. The occasion for this speech was 
the BSE crisis, which kept Europe in its grip and threatened to discredit its institutions. Far-
reaching and ambitious reforms, Romano Prodi announced, were the needs of the moment. 
An inventive vocabulary mirrored these expectations, heralding a fresh agenda and a novel 
form of governing: a re-organization of the relations between political and civil society 
actors; a democratization of the relations between the different layers of governance in 
Europe. To numerous political scientists and even some lawyers, this vision had the potential 
of bringing order to those legally diffuse spaces between technocratic and administrative 
action and of leading to a renewed democratization of European governing.43 
One of the insights of the debate concerned the phenomenon’s ubiquity: the ‘turn to 
governance’ is by no means a purely European Sonderweg. It happens everywhere—within 
and beyond the nation state. ‘Governance’ ostensibly is a response to interdependent 
phenomena: to deficits of traditional interventionist law, to the erosion of state government 
and to the emergence of post-national constellations. 
The interdependence of these phenomena is the starting point of our argument, which will 
be presented in three steps. First, we begin with a reflection on the national level. The shift 
from government to governance was already portrayed and discussed decades ago, albeit in a 
somewhat different vocabulary—thus, the responses developed in the 1980s, we argue, are 
worthwhile re-discovering. They remain attractive because they opened law to new 
requirements without to betray its proprium, i.e., its potential to control and legitimize the 
exercise of public power. Second, at the European level the turn to governance came about 
for similar reasons. The intensified Internal Market policy confronted the EC with tasks, 
which could only be tackled with ‘new forms of governance’. Although similarities between 
the turn to governance at the European and the national level are striking, a marked 
discrepancy remains. Europe has to ‘govern’ a ‘market without a state’ and, therefore, can 
only stick to the notion of a legally mediated legitimacy by matching law to this non-state 
constellation. The third and final step concerns the international (WTO) level. Here neither 
national nor European reactions to ‘the turn to governance’ provide a valid model. Due to this 
difficulty, only technocratic notions of legitimacy might provide a solution. However, one 
can imagine alternatives, indeed. 
 
III.1 Practices of governance in constitutional states: ‘bringing the 1980s back in’ 
The apparently unstoppable career of the conception of governance is novel. The phenomena 
the concept denotes, however, are by no means new. In particular in Germany the 
involvement of non-state actors into law-making and their engagement in political 
programmes, designed by governments to tackle social problems, is as old as the country’s 
‘organized capitalism’. Especially in the wake of privatization and deregulation initiatives, in 
the context of ‘risk society’ with its demanding requirements and in Europeanization and 
globalization processes, the reflected use and sophisticated design of contemporary ‘modes’ 
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of governance is what has changed and is innovative. In all issue-areas and on all levels, new 
practices of governance collide with more traditional concepts of ‘the private’ and ‘the 
public’. This leads to the ubiquitous question—alas mainly tackled by lawyers44—what legal 
costs the turn to governance involve and what politico-societal potential it has to offer.45 
Naturally, this provokes sceptics and proponents simultaneously. In a traditionally 
conservative discipline, proponents have a particularly hard time, although their arguments 
are well worthwhile engaging with. The American administrative lawyer Jody Freeman 
defines ‘governance’ as a ‘set of negotiated relationships between public and private actors’, 
which may concern ‘policy-making, implementation and enforcement’.46 Its ever widening 
use is remarkable. Freeman points to the generation of norms and standards reaching from 
health care to the management of prisons. Some of these activities clearly touch upon public 
functions. Does this imply that any involvement of non-state actors is illegitimate? It is most 
interesting, how Freeman responds to this problem: the inclusion of private actors into 
governance arrangements ‘might extend public values to private actors to reassure public law 
scholars that mechanisms exist for structuring public-private partnerships in democracy-
enhancing ways’.47 
Given that all this would apply, the performance of such partnerships would be by far 
superior to the achievements of governmental actors and bureaucracies. Justifications, 
arguing for the ‘turn to governance’ with reference to its ‘output’, would then be pointless. 
Instead, we would deal with an aliud to traditional administration, with a productive reaction 
to the impasse of traditional forms of politico-administrative performance within the modern 
welfare state. This complex problématique cannot be elaborated in the brief space given here. 
It might, however, be instructive to remember the criticism of legal theory towards political 
and legal interventionism back in the 1980s—and their following quest for conceptions of a 
‘post-interventionist’ law. Doubtlessly, the governance debate would benefit from a fresh 
look at this debate. 
The disappointment about ineffective, ‘purposive’ legal programs48  coexisted with the 
concern about the ‘colonization of the life-world’49 through welfare programs, their legal and 
administrative implementation. These perceptions shared the understanding that economic 
and social processes in modern societies were embedded in far more complex ways than the 
common simple dichotomies—market and state, economy and intervention, law and 
politics—suggested. This triggered a further search for new modes of legal rationality, which 
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were to replace interventionism within the welfare state and its ‘material’ legal rationality but 
without falling back into classical legal formalism and its characteristic weakness in the face 
of economic and social power. Furthermore, the new legal rationality was supposed to 
uncover the myth that law might be able to control social reality via the ‘application’ of social 
theories. 
The ‘proceduralization’ 50  of legal categories and ‘reflexive law’ became the new 
promising centres of attention. 51  Both strands of thinking have engaged with numerous 
dimensions of legal praxis: with implementation deficits, alternatives to ‘command and 
control’ regulations,52 alternatives to strict (judicial) conflict settlements, alternatives to ‘hard 
law’, etc. These considerations anticipated topics of the current governance debates, as law—
intending to foster the effectiveness of economic and social regulation and to guarantee its 
far-reaching social legitimacy—is drawn into the re-conceptionalization of constitutional, 
administrative and private legal spheres. Furthermore, law has to go through a cognitive 
opening of exactly those normative expectations, it once had entirely focussed on.  
 
III.2 The constitutionalization of European governance practices: perspectives 
The praxis of European governance preceded the conceptual debate by far. It established 
numerous institutional innovations before the concept of ‘governance’ itself gained any 
prominence. To recall the most prominent examples, already touched upon in this essay: at 
the beginning of the 1980s, the ‘new approach to technical harmonization and 
standardization’ established stable and cooperative relations between non-state organizations, 
administrative bodies and experts from industry and science. Europeanization has managed to 
re-shape these, formerly national, arrangements in such a manner that they are able to operate 
across borders and on different levels. In the governance arrangements within the food sector, 
the presence of administrative bodies has been relatively strong—here the long tradition 
continues to have an effect that ’food safety’ is seen as a primary domain of state 
administration. However, especially this sector has become the key example for the European 
comitology system. And yet it has as well become a governance arrangement par excellence. 
How do such arrangements match with our more traditional notions of government, 
administration, and the separation of powers? Can such hybrid arrangements be legitimate at 
all? Is it likely that their legitimacy can be mediated by law?  
Primarily, these questions concern the ‘nature’ of the European political system, nowadays 
widely characterized as a multi-level system organizing political action in the form of 
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networks.53 Such claims have far-reaching implications. If competences and resources for 
political action are located at various and relatively autonomous European levels of 
governance, the problem-solving ability of politics hinges upon the smooth communication 
between functionally link, yet relatively autonomous actors. 
Compelling normative reasons can be identified to institute a commitment to cooperation 
even in such constellations. Such obligations can even be directly derived from the post-
national constellation, in which the Member States of the EU find themselves. At the same 
time, these obligations systematically hinge upon the so-called democratic deficit of the EU: 
not only the mutual dependence of the Member States, rooting in their interconnections and 
interdependence, provides arguments in favour of an obligation to cooperate. These 
interconnections at the same time imply that no state in Europe can take decisions of some 
political weight limited to itself: There is no decision without ‘extra-territorial’ effects on 
neighbouring states. 
Put provocatively, but indisputable: the Member States of the EU have lost their ability to 
act democratically, as their decisions are not legitimized by all those affected by them. This 
counter-objection, responding to the popular lament about the European democratic deficit, is 
not meant to argue that the deficit does not exist or should not be taken seriously. Our point, 
here, is that the EU can be understood as an institutionalized compensation of democratic 
deficits of its Member States. The deficit is caused by the European nation states’ inability to 
include all those citizens affected by their decisions in elections, decision-making and will-
formation. These lapses are structural and of fundamental importance. This holds, of course, 
for the OECD-world in general—and this is why an international conflict of laws, reacting to 
such deficits, is ‘legitimate’. However, within the EU, the interdependence of national 
societies is very substantial. The legal framework which has emerged to cope with these 
interdependence is so far unique and not available beyond the EU itself. 
We conclude, therefore, that the widespread complaint about the democracy in Europe is 
biased towards the democratic deficits of the European political edifice. However, it neglects 
the structurally caused democratic inability of the Member States. It fails, hence, to utilize the 
potential of European law to remedy the democratic deficits of European nation states. Such a 
vision of European law suspends the notion that European institutions should be 
‘democratized’ according to a national model. Moreover, it seeks to conceptualize the 
European multi-level construct in such a way that it is not just compatible with democratic 
processes, but might even strengthen them. 
This is the program of a ‘deliberative’ supranationalism in stark contrast to the orthodox 
claim of a supremacy of European law.54 It turns the common view of the EU’s legitimacy 
problematic upside down. But it relmians nevertheless faithful to the grand principles of 
European law: the Member States of the Union are not allowed to define and implement their 
interests and laws in a prejudiced manner. They are obliged to respect the four freedoms. The 
regulatory policies, they want to pursue, have to be recognized by the Community as 
legitimate. Provisions concerning non-discrimination are the strongest indication for such a 
post-national re-orientation of the nation state. It follows, therefore, that the Member States 
have to coordinate their policies and set up national regulations in the most Community-
friendly way. 
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In the field of product regulation, we have attributed crucial qualities to ‘deliberative 
supranationalism’:55 the empirical claim goes that the EU-specific comitology system in the 
area of food fosters a deliberative mode of interaction in its process of problem-solving. The 
normative-legal dimension of this line of reasoning takes up our previous consideration 
concerning the conflict-of-laws approach. Following such argument, European law gains its 
legitimacy by providing meta-norms which allow dealing and coping with legal differences; 
we coined this ‘deliberative supranationalism I’. 
Especially, the area of product regulation raises issues demanding a cognitive opening of 
decision-making processes. Such epistemic problems, however, cannot simply be tackled in 
an objectivist-scientific or technocratic manner, as they always mingle with normative, 
political and ethical concerns. This is where the ‘deliberative supranationalism II’ comes into 
play: it organizes and structures a second order conflict of laws. Its intricacies are substantial. 
Can such a transnational kind of problem-solving still figure as rule-bound governing? What 
criteria are available in order to evaluate the legitimacy of such rules? Will they impinge on 
the praxis of governance to an extent which finally warrants them ‘constitutional’ qualities? 
Are they sufficient to ‘constitutionalize’ the European system of comitology, for instance? 
Conclusive answers, covering all ‘new forms of governance’, are hardly conceivable. The 
‘deliberative supranationalism II’, however, provides at least some reference points. 
Two such points can easily be constituted by negative exclusion: the ‘turn to governance’ 
seems irreversible, hence the difficulty cannot be avoided such a constitutionalization of legal 
justifications beyond established constitutional patterns poses. Furthermore, should we not 
expect for the EU level, what has become impossible on the national level, namely the 
establishing of a transnational, administrative machinery led by the European Commission 
and responsible towards the European Parliament. 56  Instead we argue that the 
constitutionalization of ‘European governance’ should further explore three strategies in 
particular: 
• It should build on the self-interests of non-state actors and, especially, of 
standardization bodies into fair, politically and socially responsive procedures. This 
interest is grounded in the need to generate public trust in their capabilities.57 
• They should build on the ‘shadows of the law’, which provide space for the activities of 
non-state actors and bureaucracies without prescribing them in detail and, therefore, 
allowing them to concretize its intention via their justifications. 
• By introducing ‘hard’ procedural requirements, they should ensure that the 
‘governance’ of the Internal Market remains open for revision, e.g. in cases in which 
new insights gain prominence among politically accountable and legitimate actors or in 
which preferences change due to good reasons. 
 
III.3 Towards (‘constitutionalized’) law-mediated legitimacy of transnational governance 
All legal difficulties of governance at the national level can be found again at the European 
level, albeit in even more complex and challenging variants. 
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As defined in the preceding sections, governance phenomena are reactions to regulatory 
‘needs’ that the traditional legal system paradoxically could neither satisfy nor reject.58 The 
reasons for both these lapses and the learning processes the law has gone through at the 
national and European level provide the starting points for the following concluding remarks, 
which will proceed in three steps. First, we will outline the special characteristics of 
juridification in the area of transnational market governance; second, we will review three 
types of responses to its legitimacy problématique, i.e., technocratic rationality, transnational 
‘administrative’ law and societal constitutionalism. Third, due to the limitations of all these 
approaches, one non-judicializable element remains partly latent, partly manifest effective: 
this alternative to conflict of laws is comitas.59 
(1) ‘Juridification’ 
The ‘juridification’ of international and transnational politics has certainly intensified in 
recent decades. So much so that all legal disciplines as well as the theory of International 
Relations, Political Theory and philosophy are in the process of re-defining their established 
premises. In the post-national constellation a new law emerges, a ‘law without a state’, yet we 
should not equate this law with the law of constitutional democracies.60 
The governance phenomena explored in this essay just concern one facet of these 
developments. From the vantage point of both the theory of international law and idealist 
notions of transnational democracy, this segment may even seem mundane. We argue, 
however, that it is theoretically explosive. In fact, it concerns regulatory issues and practices 
of governance, which cannot be pigeonholed within traditional legal categories, normally 
allowing perceiving, structure and solving legal issues. We have repeatedly argued that this 
situation applies to all levels of governance. Yet, the difficulties to legally embed diverse 
forms of governance increase with the level they are situated on. 
(2) Forms of transnational governance 
In this essay, we have strongly argued in favour of one variant of juridicialization—a conflict-
of-laws approach to transnational juridification. It is by no means the only variant, but one 
hardly known. Face to its alternatives, conflict of laws should, however, become ever more 
attractive. Its competing alternatives outlined here cannot figure as substitute for the 
democratically constituted nation state, yet they are of interest because they rely on different 
forms of rationality and legitimacy. 
(a) Economic constitutional law 
In this respect, the constitutive phase of the European Community is particularly 
instructive. Then, one answer to the democratic deficit within the integration process—
nowadays almost ubiquitous—was developed, which has hitherto not lost importance and 
which has been transferred to the international level as well: the ordo-liberal theory of 
economic constitution sought both to structure and limit European governance through 
supranationally institutionalized economic freedoms, through the guarantee of free trade and 
through a system of effective competition. 61  The constitutional view of WTO law, 
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particularly present in the works of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, rests in this tradition.62 In our 
context, we will leave this strand of argument aside as the protection of economic freedoms 
and competition does not touch upon concerns related to ‘social regulation’. Such disregard, 
however, rests upon a well-founded criticism:63 we assume that markets are social institutions 
which react among others to social concerns; thus, it is that we are interested in their 
normative infrastructure, their networks of formalized and semi-formal relations channelling 
decisions, which economic analyses of the working of markets mainly ignore or overlook. 
(b) Technocratic rationality 
A second answer to the democratic deficit of European ‘governance’ emerged in early 
years and has hitherto remained of importance too: in this view, Europe is confronted with 
substantial issues of ‘technical and social realization’, which can best be tackled by a self-
restrained apolitical elite of experts and technocrats. 64  A contemporary version of this 
argument might be found in the new approach to harmonization and standardization. 
‘Scientific expertise’ is its most prominent equivalent at the international level; a fact we have 
extensively highlighted in the discussion of the hormones case. Again, there are compelling 
reasons for the attractiveness of science as the medium of legitimation for transnational 
governance. ‘Science’ claims and gains genuine authority. This authority is perceived as 
objective, without interest and apolitical. The standards of good science are not bound to a 
specific legal system, which fosters the binding quality of scientific results, yet the latter are 
quasi by definition transnationally and universally valid. Legal systems subject themselves to 
‘external’ validity criteria by resorting to scientific expertise—and overcome their territorial 
parochialism precisely for this reason. This, hence, requires that an objective science is, 
indeed, possible and able to provide answers to questions posed to it. However, the myth of 
scientific objectivity has irreversibly collapsed.65 
Experts and science need an institutional framework in order to be able to govern. The EU 
puts new agencies to the test, yet they do not resemble a transnational technocracy similar to 
the European comitology system and the new approach with its ‘private transnationalism’. 
There are no equivalents to European agencies or the comitology system at the international 
level. However, the international markets still get ‘their law’. 
The standardization bodies for foodstuff (CAC) and technical products (ISO, IEC, ITU) 
are all linked to the WTO, to other governmental and non-state actor and to national legal 
systems. Their authority in the field of product regulation hinges upon the issue-orientation of 
these links—and on the mutual trust that they are able to generate. Here ‘expertise’ is a 
necessary, yet not a sufficient condition. A second potential source for legitimacy is the 
quality of their standardization procedures as their decisions might be difficult and beyond a 
simple application of objective, scientific knowledge. 
Relevant studies about these organizations come to more sophisticated conclusions. Before 
the backdrop of internal CAC procedures, the technique of incorporating CAC standards into 
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the WTO system (Article 3.2 SPS Agreement) has especially been criticized. The criticism 
goes that these procedures do not justify the preferential treatment provided within the SPS 
Agreement. In the Hormones case, the Appellate Body had typically been very cautious in 
determining the legal status of the CAC standards and was reluctant to perceive them as 
legally binding norms.66  
The Appellate Body, we can conclude, has accepted the need to integrate regulatory 
policies into the system of free trade but shies away from imposing them as legal obligations. 
Foodstuff standardization, hence, remains closely embedded in the political process. This 
embeddedness, however, shares hardly any resemblance with the European comitology 
system as the latter’s legitimacy rests upon the epistemic and political, legally protected 
potential of deliberative processes. 
(c)  Societal constitutionalism 
Caveats, similar to those raised against the CAC procedures, are hardly brought forward in 
the criticism of international standardization by ISO and IEC. In general, their evaluation is 
more favourable. The most positive one can be found in Harm Schepel’s line of reasoning, 
which at the same time offers the most challenging theoretical account in this area of study. 
In Harm Schepel’s argument,67 there is hardly any resemblance between practices of ‘good 
governance’ in the area of European and international standardization and those forms of 
political rule established within the institutional setting of constitutional states. Instead, he 
argues, that ‘good governance’ hinges on the innovative practices of networks as horizontal 
forms of interaction with their particular method of dealing with political controversies, 
allowing actors, political and non-political, public and private, to arrive at mutually 
acceptable decisions via negotiation and deliberative processes. This observation and its 
evaluation might surprise: a productive and legitimate synergy of market forces and civil 
society finds no room within traditional theories of democracy, neither in theories revolving 
around elective majorities and rooting in the notion of demos nor in deliberative accounts 
substituting the demos with a reasoning public. How is this possible? According to Schepel, 
the paradox is simply that the mechanisms themselves are political. 68  Those principles 
fundamental to the process of standardization—fairness, transparency, openness, unbiased 
interest representation—are all norms fostering constructive and substantial deliberation. 
They are by no means mere mechanisms seeking to establish scientific ‘truth’ or propagating 
an ‘invisible hand’. 
Schepel coins this phenomenon ‘private transnationalism’. The legal order of this 
transnationalism finds itself beyond the private and public law established by the state’s legal 
order. 69  For Schepel, this proves the claim that a ‘legal pluralism’ has replaced the 
hierarchically structured, unified law.70 However, we cannot simply draw on his arguments, 
when taking up our initial claims again.71 They, however, match well both with the assertion 
that modern economy and markets should be seen as ‘polities’—sites of politically significant 
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processes—and with the conclusion that state constitution has to be supplemented by a 
constitutionalism involving society. 
Our argument is that such a societal constitutionalism simultaneously responds to three 
interrelated phenomena: 72  the ‘politicization’ of markets; the emergence of governance 
arrangements recognizing and drawing on the problem-solving capacities and managerial 
qualities of private actors; and the appearance of transnational governance in post-national 
constellations. All this, however, does not imply that the era of legally bound governing and 
legally mediated legitimacy has come to an end. Even if non-state actors strongly commit 
themselves to established, normative standards, following Harm Schepel, their legitimacy and 
autonomy still rests upon the compatibility of their institutionalization with their legal 
vicinity. Hence, it is hardly surprising that standardization bodies seek to establish such 
procedures in which society can trust as a whole, and that sufficiently self-critical law-makers 
and bureaucracies admit their inability to substitute what standardization accomplishes. 
(3) Conflict of laws and comitas 
Are the limitations of transnational juridification a malady we should try to remedy? There 
are compelling normative arguments against an ill-pondered, ever denser and deeper 
transnational legalization. In sum, they claim that there is no political authority entitled to 
take the type of decisions constitutional states are legitimated for. And yet, such a type of 
decisions, integrating and unitary, are neither needed nor appropriate in all contexts. The 
alternative, we have emphazised in this essays, is the conflict-of-laws paradigm. The 
European example, i.e., our suggested interpretation of European law as a conflict of laws of 
constitutional quality, can certainly be further developed at the WTO level. Conflicts between 
different legal systems are usually numerous and become apparent in legal differences in the 
area of social regulation. These conflicts encompass political preferences, economic interests, 
industrial policy objectives, distributional politics, cultural orientations and ethical concerns. 
A proceduralizing approach to such conflicts offers the potential of revealing the nature of 
such differences and, therefore, of initiating the quest for meta-norms rendering conflicts 
bearable. The scope and impact of conflict of laws is, however, limited: conflict of laws 
might leave all those issue to national jurisdiction, which cannot find a fair decision on the 
international level. Such a point is the distributive consequences of regulatory decisions.73 
 
 
Conclusion 
The type of proceduralized conflict resolution, we have suggested and advocated for 
international disputes here, resembles its European counterpart in so far as it propagates the 
deliberate seek for those principles and rules, which allow to keep free trade and regulatory 
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policies compatible. This has been remarkably successful within the EU. As Jona Israël 
recently put it,74 the comitas of the European Member States has transformed into a legal duty 
of cooperative problem-solving. However, the conditions for such a development have been 
favourable: on the one hand, the distributive implications of regulatory policies are, still, 
relatively cushioned. On the other hand, in it’s seek for problem-oriented regulations, the EU 
was able to establish effective governance arrangements—a ‘second order conflict of laws’ 
whose ‘constitutionalization’ seems at least possible. 
At the WTO level, the wide-ranging general conversion of comitas into mandatory 
commitments may be ‘a step too far’, 75  to rephrase a famous caveat concerning the 
constitutionalization of the WTO. Arguing in favour of a conflict of laws juridification of 
international economic law based on the ‘standard of reasonableness’, Andreas F. Lowenfeld 
might reply  that such formulas seem only then insufficient when jurisprudence is understood 
as a mechanistic quasi-scientific process, suspending the laborious intellectual task of 
rendering general clauses more concrete. 76  Intellectual efforts alone cannot overcome 
structural obstacles to justice and they are insufficient too, where knowledge beyond the legal 
realm is needed in order to come to problem-oriented decisions. 
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